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ABSTRACT 
Nanotechnology promises to revolutionize innovation in nearly 
every industry.  However, nanomaterials’ novel properties pose 
potentially significant health and environmental risks.  Views in the 
current debate over nanotechnology regulation range from halting 
all research and development to allowing virtually unregulated 
innovation.  One viable regulatory solution balancing 
commercialization and risk is the adoption of a mandatory private-
public insurance program. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Spurred by a strong financial commitment from the federal 
government and robust private investment, nanotechnology innovation is 
developing at a rapid pace.  As investment in nanotechnology 
commercialization grows, several studies point to potentially serious 
environmental and health risks introduced by manufactured nanomaterials.  
The substantial benefits and risks of nanotechnology have resulted in wide-
ranging debate over appropriate regulation.  One viable regulatory solution 
balancing innovation and commercialization benefits with health and 
environmental concerns is the implementation of a private-public insurance 
program. 
¶2 This iBrief will discuss nanotechnology applications and risks, 
review various nanotechnology regulations, and suggest a novel approach to 
mitigating risk while maintaining appropriate incentives for innovation.  
Specifically, Section I will discuss nanotechnology research and 
development, focusing on the benefits of nanotechnology innovation and 
the potential health and environmental risks posed by nanomaterials.  
Section II will review the current debate surrounding nanotechnology 
regulation, analyzing existing applicable regulatory bodies and regulations, 
a newly suggested law, and other proposals.  Section III will consider an 
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insurance solution to regulating nanotechnology, discussing challenges 
faced by private insurers in providing nanotechnology coverage and 
proposing a private-public insurance program as a potential solution. 
I. NANOTECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND 
¶3 Nanotechnology is a term generally used to describe the production 
and use of materials on a nanometer—or one billionth of a meter—scale.2  
The width of a human hair, by comparison, is approximately one hundred 
thousand nanometers.3  Nanoparticles occur naturally in the environment or 
as byproducts of chemical reactions.4  Manufacturing of nanoscale 
materials was considered as early as 19595 and the term “nanotechnology” 
was first used in the science community in 19746.  Until recently, however, 
scientists were unable to manipulate matter close to the atomic or molecular 
scale.  Utilizing newly developed techniques, scientists can now engineer 
nanomaterials with desired properties.7 
¶4 Subsection A of this section will discuss potential benefits of 
nanotechnology engineering.  Subsection B will discuss potential 
nanotechnology risks. 
                                                     
2 DIVISION ON ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES, COMM. FOR THE REVIEW 
OF THE NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
SMALL WONDERS, ENDLESS FRONTIERS: A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL 
NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 1 (2002), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10395.html [hereinafter SMALL WONDERS]. 
3 Id. 
4 John Balbus et al., Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time, 21 ISSUES IN 
SCI. & TECH., July 9, 2005, at 66. 
5 See Francisco Castro, Legal and Regulatory Concerns Facing 
Nanotechnology, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 140, 140 (2004) (discussing 
Richard Feynman’s speech at the meeting of the American Physical Society). 
6 Louis M. Troilo, Patentability and Enforcement Issues Related to 
Nanotechnology Inventions, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 36, 36 n.2 (2005) 
(citing N. Taniguchi, On the Basic Concept of Nanotechnology, PROC. INTL. 
CONF. PROD. ENG., Tokyo, Part II (1974)).  The individual associated most with 
popularizing nanotechnology is Eric Drexler who explored the area in depth in 
his 1986 book, ENGINES OF CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGY.  Ivan Amato, The Apostle of Nanotechnology, 254 SCI. 
1310, 1310 (Nov. 29, 1991). 
7 See Balbus supra note 4, at 66.  See generally Rep. Mike Honda, 
Nanotechnology Legislation in the 108th Congress, NANOTECH. L. & BUS., Feb. 
2004, at 63, 64 (noting that nanotechnology research began in NASA’s Silicon 
Valley facility in 1996). 
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A. Nanotechnology Benefits 
¶5 Nanoscale materials exhibit novel properties, including reactivity, 
electrical conductivity and changes in surface chemistry.8  If appropriately 
harnessed, these novel properties may effect innovation in almost every 
industry.9  For instance, scientists and engineers working on energy and 
environmental initiatives believe that nanotechnology will revolutionize 
energy production, water treatment, and environmental remediation.10  The 
National Science Foundation (NSF) predicts that over the next decade the 
pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries will strongly rely on 
nanotechnology.11 
¶6 The ability to manipulate and create nanomaterials is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, nonetheless the evolution of nanotechnology 
engineering is predicted to grow very rapidly.  Linda Breggin, Senior 
Attorney, Environmental Law Institute (ELI), and Leslie Carothers, 
President of ELI, predict that nanotechnology sophistication will undergo 
four stages before 2020.12  The first stage, which already passed, includes 
the development of passive nanostructures with a focus on manufacturing 
coatings, polymers and ceramics.  The second stage includes the 
advancement of active nanostructures used in developing transistors, 
targeted drugs, and actuators.  The third stage, which is predicted to occur in 
the year 2010, focuses on robotics, three-dimensional networks, and guided 
assemblers.  The fourth stage, called the molecular nanosystems stage, 
includes the creation of molecules by design and the development of 
evolutionary systems.13 
¶7 The NSF predicts that nanotechnology will represent a one trillion 
dollar market by 2015 and will employ two million workers.14  Some 
commentators predict that by 2014, fifteen percent of all goods 
                                                     
8 Balbus supra note 4, at 65. 
9 See Linda Breggin & Leslie Carothers, Governing Uncertainty: The 
Nanotechnology Environmental Health & Safety Challenge, 31 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 285 (2006). 
10 Balbus supra note 4, at 65. 
11 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge of Regulating Known 
Unknowns, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 704, 705 (2006). 
12 See Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 291.
13 Id. 
14 MIHAIL C. ROCO & WILLIAM S. BAINBRID, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SOCIETAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.wtec.org/loyola/nano/societalimpact/nanosi.pdf.  See also Sonia 
Arrison, Nanotechnology Needs Nano-Scale Regulation, TECHNEWSWORLD, 
Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/48272.html.
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manufactured globally will involve nanotechnology.15  The economic 
potential of nanotechnology is apparent from the investment therein at the 
federal, state and private-sector levels.  The federal government committed 
over one billion dollars in nanotechnology funding when it enacted the 21st 
Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act.16  California is 
attempting to create a “Nano-Valley” in hopes of reaping benefits similar to 
those Silicon Valley provided to the state.17  In 2004, venture capital funds 
invested almost five hundred million dollars in nanotechnology start-ups.18  
Nearly 300 nanoproducts are already commercially available,19 and over 
4,000 nanotechnology patents have been issued since 1985.20  The United 
States is not alone in trying to capitalize on this technology—thirty 
countries have enacted initiatives to promote nanotechnology 
development.21 
B. Nanotechnology Risks 
¶8 The same novel properties making nanomaterials commercially 
appealing also pose potentially serious risks to human health and to the 
environment.22  Nanoparticles can enter the human body through skin 
                                                     
15 J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, EPA 
AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: OVERSIGHT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 32 (2007) (citing 
LUX RESEARCH, THE NANOTECH REPORT iii (4th. ed. 2006)), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&eve
nt_id=237810. 
16 President George W. Bush signed the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research 
and Development Act on December 3, 2003.  Honda, supra note 7, at 63, 68 
(appropriations totaled $809.8 million for fiscal year 2005 and $1,024.1 million 
for fiscal year 2008). 
17 Arrison, supra note 14.
18 Wilson, supra note 11, at 705.  
19 Id. at 705; cf. Charles Choi, Nano World: New Nanotech Law Called for, 
PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Jan. 17, 2006, 
http://www.pacificresearch.org/press/clip/2006/clip-01-17-06sa.html (noting 
that approximately sixty consumer products are available on the market). 
20 Letter from Richard Denison and Karen Florini, Senior Scientist and Senior 
Attorney, Environmental Defense, to Ms. Ann R. Klee, General Counsel, U.S 
Environmental Protection Agency (May 22, 2006) (citing LUX RESEARCH, THE 
NANOTECH REPORT (4th. ed. 2006)), available at 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/5265_StatusofNMsUnderTSC
A.pdf [hereinafter Denison Letter]; cf. Lindsay V. Dennis, Comment, 
Nanotechnology: Unique Science Requires Unique Solutions, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. 
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 87, 87 (2006) (noting that nearly 11,000 existing patents 
contain the words "nano" or "nanotechnology"). 
21 James D. Thayer, Note, The SPS Agreement: Can It Regulate Trade in 
Nanotechnology?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (2005).
22 See Balbus, supra note 4, at 67. 
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absorption, ingestion or inhalation.23  Once they enter the body, because of 
their size, nanoparticles can be carried past the blood-brain barrier into brain 
cells and can pass through lung and liver tissue.24  Studies indicate that 
unique attributes of insoluble nanoparticles—a small diameter and large 
surface area—significantly increase toxicity.25  Some nanomaterials cause 
oxidative stress and localized immune lesions, and may lead to other tissue 
and cellular damage.26  Nanoparticles are also linked to dangerous air, soil 
and water pollutants.27  A Rice University study showed that certain 
individual insoluble nanoparticles become very water-soluble and 
bacteriocidal when they aggregate.28  The study raised concerns that 
nanoparticle properties can endanger ecosystems by killing bacteria 
constituting the base of the food chain.29  The existing methods of filtering 
and removing nanoparticles from water and air are very cost intensive and 
generally unreliable.30 
¶9 The environmental and health risks that nonmaterial variants pose 
have attracted sparse scientific attention.  A report by Lux Research 
indicates that over 10,000 nanotechnology research articles were published 
in 2005, of those, approximately fifty focused on nanotechnology 
                                                     
23 Wilson, supra note 11, at 708. 
24 E.g., J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY, (2006), available at  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Effectsnanotechfinal.pdf; see also 
Scientist Warns of Nanotechnology Dangers, PHYSORG.COM, May 3, 2006, 
http://www.physorg.com/news65890257.html. 
25 Andrew D. Maynard & Eileen D. Kuempel, Airborne Nanostructured 
Particles and Occupational Health, 7 J. NANOPARTICLE RESEARCH 587, 607, 
(Dec. 2005). 
26 See Balbus, supra note 4, at 66.  Subsequent reviews analyzing this study’s 
use of residual organic solvents playing an important role in determining 
toxicity indicate that non-solvent varieties also show some toxicity to bacteria.  
Email from Mark Wiesner, James L. Meriam Professor of Civil 
and Environmental Engineering, Pratt School of Engineering, to author (Sept. 6, 
2007, 01:56 EST) (on file with author). 
27 See generally ANNABELLE HETT, NANOTECHNOLOGY: SMALL MATTER, MANY 
UNKNOWNS 1, 15-29 (2004), available at 
http://www.swissre.com/resources/31598080455c7a3fb154bb80a45d76a0-
Publ04_Nano_en.pdf. 
28 See Balbus, supra note 4, at 66. 
29 Id. at 65. 
30 See HETT, supra note 27, at 30 (discussing centrifugation and ultrafiltration as 
means of removing nanoparticles from water, and air-purification filters as 
means of removing nanoparticles from air). 
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environmental, health, and safety issues.31  The dearth of academic and 
industry attention in studying nanotechnology risk is less surprising when 
one considers that federal funding for health and environmental risk 
research represents only four percent of the proposed federal investment.32  
Postponing research of nanotechnology risks until after health and 
environmental damage manifests is unwise.  Indeed, if industry experience 
with asbestos, ammonia, methyl chloride, sulfur dioxide and 
chlorofluorocarbons is any indicator of the consequences of disregarding 
risks during the early stages of production and distribution,33 then 
neglecting to adequately plan for these risks will lead to “lengthy regulatory 
battles, costly cleanup efforts, expensive litigation quagmires, and painful 
public-relations debacles.”34 
II. REGULATION DEBATE 
¶10 In 2001, the federal government created the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to coordinate federal nanotechnology 
research and development projects.35  Segments of over twenty-five 
agencies, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department 
of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), fall under the NNI’s oversight.36  In 2003, the 
21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act provided an 
appropriation schedule for the NNI agencies that included over a billion 
                                                     
31 MICHAEL W. HOLMAN ET AL., TAKING ACTION ON NANOTECH 
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY RISKS, at 7 (2006) (noting that in 2000 
only eleven papers focused on environmental, health, and safety issues). 
32 Fred Krupp & Chad Holliday, Editorial, Let’s Get Nanotech Right, WALL ST. 
J., June 14, 2005, at B2. (noting that when private investment is factored in, 
funding for nanotechnology environmental and health risk research becomes 
“vanishingly small”).  Mr. Krupp is President of Environmental Defense and 
Mr. Holliday is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of DuPont. 
33 Id. 
34 Balbus, supra note 4, at 65. 
35 Honda, supra note 7, at 64. 
36 For a list of participating government departments and agencies see National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, Government Departments and Agencies, 
http://www.nano.gov/html/about/nniparticipants.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2008). 
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dollars for fiscal year 2008.37  Further, the 108th and 109th Congresses held 
numerous hearings on the societal implications of nanotechnology.38 
¶11 The strong financial commitment of the federal government, 
compounded by significant private investment, resulted in rapid 
development of nanotechnology innovation.  The rapid development led to 
fierce debates to determine the appropriate level of nanotechnology 
regulation.  Commentators generally discuss four regulatory approaches: (1) 
a complete ban on nanotechnology research, (2) strict government 
regulation for private research and development, (3) adjustment to the 
existing regulatory regimes to make them more applicable to 
nanotechnology, and (4) a voluntary self-regulatory regime for private 
research and development.39 
¶12 This iBrief will not specifically address the merits of each 
regulatory approach.  Rather, subsection A of this section will discuss 
existing regulatory bodies and regulations.  Subsection B will discuss a 
proposal for a new nanotechnology-specific law, and subsection C will 
examine other regulatory proposals. 
A. Existing Regulatory Bodies and Regulations 
¶13 Currently no regulations exist applying specifically to 
nanomaterials.40  Statutes most relevant to nanotechnology regulation 
                                                     
37 Honda, supra note 7, at 68. 
38 Breggin & Leslie, supra note 9, at 296, n. 47-50 (noting the many hearings 
before Congress concerning nanotechnology); see, e.g., Societal Implications of 
Nanotechnology: Hearing on H.R. 766 Before the H. Comm. on Science, 108th 
Cong. (2003); Environmental and Safety Impacts on Nanotechnology: What 
Research is Needed?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. 1 
(2005); Developments in Nanotechnology: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (Feb. 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Ted Stevens, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation); Press Release, Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, Senator Jeffords' Statement on Nanotechnology (Apr. 6, 2006), 
available at http://epw.senate.gov/pressitem.cfm?party=dem&id=253725; 
Promoting Economic Development Opportunities Through Nano 
Commercialization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Trade, Tourism, and 
Econ. Dev., 108th Cong. (May 4, 2006). 
39 E.g., Satya Thallam, Commentary, Nanotech, MERCATUS REPORTS, Fall 2006, 
at 4-5, available at 
http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20061108_Regulation_Fall_2006.p
df. 
40 Scott Segal, Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology: Avoiding Big 
Mistakes for Small Machines, 1 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 290, 295 (2004); 
Holman, supra note 31, at 12. 
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include the Toxic Substances Control Act41 (TSCA), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act42 (OSHA) and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
43(FDCA).44 
¶14 The EPA attempts to regulate nanomaterials under the TSCA, 
which was enacted to ensure that adequate safeguards are put in place 
before new chemicals are marketed to consumers.45  Chemical substances 
manufactured at the nanoscale level are arguably subject to regulation under 
either the Section 5(a)(1) requirements for new chemical substances or the 
Section 5(a)(2) requirements for existing chemical substances.46 
¶15 There are challenges to TSCA’s effectiveness in regulating 
nanotechnology.47  For instance, although tiny amounts of nanoparticles can 
be toxic, the TSCA excludes certain chemicals made in relatively small 
quantities.48  Also, under Section 5(a)(1), new chemicals are grouped based 
on their toxicity similarities to existing chemicals, but such groupings may 
be inappropriate for nanomaterials.49 
¶16 The EPA issued six broad initiatives in February 2007 to underline 
its role in nanotechnology regulation, more than two years after the federal 
government’s first round of funding.50  Among the initiatives is the 
Voluntary Stewardship Program, which encourages nanotechnology 
developers to provide the EPA with research data that can be used to 
develop best practices.51  The Voluntary Stewardship Program has come 
                                                     
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2006). 
42 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006). 
43 21 U.S.C. §§ 300-399 (2006). 
44 Other laws that are possibly applicable to nanotechnology regulation include: 
the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  DAVIES, supra note 24, at 10-14 
(arguing that even if these laws apply to nanotechnology, their only practical 
effect in many situations is the imposition of a ban on particle release into the 
environment). 
45 Id. at 13. 
46 Christopher L. Bell et al., Regulation of Nanoscale Materials under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T., ENERGY, AND RESOURCES 7, 
13, available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/nanotech/pdf/TSCA.pdf. 
47 E.g., Davies, supra note 24, at 10-12 (arguing that TSCA only applies to 
macro particles, which is a generic term referring to non-nanoparticles). 
48 Kevin Bullis, New Nano Law?, TECH. REV., Jan. 17, 2006, 
http://www.technologyreview.com/article/16323. 
49 See generally Denison Letter, supra note 20. 
50 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NANOTECHNOLOGY WHITE PAPER (2007), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/OSA/pdfs/nanotech/epa-nanotechnology-whitepaper-
0207.pdf. 
51 Id. at 68, 89-90. 
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under strong criticism, and commentators exhibit doubt whether the 
program creates sufficient incentives for industry participation.52 
¶17 In May 2007, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars issued a report proposing more than twenty-five actions that the 
EPA can take to improve oversight of nanotechnologies.  Central 
recommendations include increasing federal government focus on 
researching the health and environmental effects of nanotechnology, as well 
as specific ways of changing the TSCA to cover nanoparticles.53 
¶18 The OSHA, which is implemented by the Department of Labor 
(DOL), sets standards for hazardous airborne particles.  However, the 
OSHA’s determination of an acceptable quantity of toxic airborne 
substances applies to macro-particles.  Most commentators agree that even 
if OSHA can be expanded to cover nanoparticles, the agency’s current 
under-funding makes regulation almost impossible.54 
¶19 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implements the FDCA, 
which regulates drugs, medical devices, biologics, cosmetics and food.55  
The FDA classifies nanoparticles as a variation of their base macro 
substance and only requires new substances to be registered.56  The FDA 
claims that existing regulations are sufficient for nanomaterials despite not 
requiring pre-market approval for products such as cosmetics.57 
¶20 In 2002, the NNI agencies and the White House National Economic 
Council formed a review committee to evaluate interagency coordination 
efforts, the suitability of federal investments, and risk coordination.58  The 
committee made ten general recommendations, none of which dealt with 
monitoring or establishing risk guidelines.  Further, the EPA’s Science 
Advisor, Paul Gilman, noted that none of the agencies focus on the 
convergence of nanomaterial jurisdiction across agencies.59 
B. A Proposal for a New Nanotechnology-Specific Law 
¶21 Clarence Davies, a senior advisor to the Project on Emerging 
Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, recently suggested a new law as the appropriate regulatory 
response.60  Davies argues that existing laws and agencies have significant 
                                                     
52 See, e.g., Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 295. 
53 DAVIES, supra note 24, at 5-6. 
54 E.g., id. at 12. 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 HETT, supra note 27, at 36. 
57 HOLMAN, supra note 31, at 12-13. 
58 SMALL WONDERS, supra note 2, at 1. 
59 Segal, supra note 40, at 301. 
60 DAVIES, supra note 24, at 3. 
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flaws making them inapplicable to nanotechnology.  His most ardent 
criticisms of existing regulatory laws include: (1) inability to account for the 
uniqueness of nanomaterial behavior, (2) shortcomings in legal authority to 
monitor nanotechnology adequately, and (3) under-funding by the federal 
government of enforcement and measurement mechanisms.61 
¶22 The proposed law focuses on products rather than the environment, 
and shifts the burden from the regulatory agencies to the manufacturers.  
The law requires manufacturers to prove that newly developed 
nanomaterials are safe to consumers and manufacturers.62  Davies concedes 
that an effective, coordinated, intra-agency program, similar to the 
framework established for biotechnology, may be viable.63  He notes, 
however, that given the current political climate, passing a new law or 
adjusting existing laws regulating commercial products is highly unlikely.64  
His proposal is not without substantive opposition, with many arguing that 
it could harm small businesses and hinder innovation.65 
C. Other Regulatory Solutions 
¶23 Nanotechnology proposals run the gamut from completely banning 
nanotechnology production to eliminating all regulation.  Suggestions 
include creating a new federal department overseeing all emerging 
technologies,66 approaching regulation from a transnational perspective,67 
and regulating ex post by relying on traditional tort or workers’ 
compensation remedies.68 
                                                     
61 Id. at 3, 8.  These criticisms are grounded in the challenge to create 
appropriate nomenclature for nanomaterials.  For instance, “if C60 [bucky balls] 
is not toxic, but aggregates of C60 are toxic, then what [level] of aggregate is 
toxic . . . [or] do you regulate the initial C60 . . . if so does that include all 
derivatives of C60?” Email from Mark Wiesner, James L. Meriam Professor 
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Pratt School of Engineering to author 
(Sept. 6, 2007, 01:56 EST) (on file with author). 
62 DAVIES, supra note 24, at 18. 
63 Id. at 16. 
64 Id. at 10. 
65 E.g., Choi, supra note 19. 
66 See Dennis, supra note 20, at 112. 
67 Although this iBrief does not address international and cross-border 
approaches to nanotechnology regulation, see Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J. 
Sylvester, Symposium Article: Part III, How Do We Develop Regulatory Policy 
in the Context of Limited Knowledge about Risks?: Transitional Model for 
Regulation of Nanotechnolgy, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 714 (2006); see also 
Thayer, supra note 21. 
68 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The Interaction Between Product Liability and 
Workers' Compensation as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 5 J. LAW, 
ECON. & ORG. 185, 186 (1989). 
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¶24 Overall, dozens of non-governmental organizations have opined on 
nanotechnology regulation.69  Some argue that manufacturer self-regulation 
coupled with the existing light federal regulatory framework is the best 
approach to ensuring that nanotechnology’s full market and social potential 
is attained.70  Several consortia of private nanotechnology research and 
development companies have taken proactive steps by outlining potential 
self-regulation approaches and setting standards.71  Commentators in favor 
of self-regulation argue that mere perception of risk, rather than actual risk, 
should not serve as a basis for government intervention.72  Also, they point 
to biotechnology, where restraint in regulatory intervention has led to 
significant innovative breakthroughs with almost no danger to public 
safety.73 
¶25 Opposing those arguing for manufacturer self-regulation are those 
arguing in favor of a slowdown of, or even a complete ban on, nanomaterial 
production until environmental and health risks are appropriately 
ascertained.  These groups included the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
the Center for Technology Assessment, and Greenpeace.74 
¶26 Many commentators urge that a comprehensive, multi-pronged 
approach that “include[s] elements of regulatory and voluntary programs 
under existing environmental statutes; corporate stewardship; tort liability; 
federal, state, and local legislation; voluntary standards; disclosure; liability 
                                                     
69 Some of the prominent non-governmental organizations include: Action 
Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group); Center for 
Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN); Center on 
Nanotechnology and Society (Nano & Society); Center for Nanotechnology in 
Society (CNS); Center for Responsible Nanotechnology (CRN); Environmental 
Law Institute (ELI); Friends of the Earth (FOE); International Risk Governance 
Council (IRGC); Meridian Institute; and Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars’ Project on Emerging Nanotechnology.  Breggin & Carothers, 
supra note 9, at 299-303. 
70 Choi, supra note 19. 
71 Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 298 (noting that the industry groups 
include the American Chemistry Council’s Chemstar Nanotechnology Panel, the 
NanoBusiness Alliance, and the Nanoparticle Benchmarking Occupational 
Health, Safety and Environment Program); Edward Rashba et al, Standards in 
Nanotechnology, 1 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 185, 188 (2004) (noting that the 
industry groups include the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(“IEEE”) and the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (“ASME”)). 
72 See, e.g., HOLMAN, supra note 31, at 3.  For a general discussion of risk 
perception, see Howard Kunreuther, Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an 
Uncertain World, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 257 (2002). 
73 Arrison, supra note 14.  Ms. Arrison is the director of Technology Studies at 
the California-based Pacific Research Institute. 
74 Thallam, supra note 39, at 5. 
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insurance; and international measures” is the best way to balance innovation 
and commercialization benefits with health and environmental risk 
concerns.75  Perhaps the best attempt at setting nanotechnology 
development standards is spearheaded by the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI), whose members include government agencies, 
organizations, companies, and academic and international bodies.76 
III. INSURANCE SOLUTION 
¶27 When faced with uncertain risks, the government may choose to set 
regulation anywhere along the ex post to ex ante precautionary spectrum.77  
Because government regulations strongly influence enterprise decisions, 
regulatory uncertainty adversely affects manufacturer productivity.78  
Uncertainty disables enterprises from making the cost-benefit calculations 
necessary to determine appropriate risk-optimizing behavior.79  As 
nanotechnology manufacturers await—possibly indefinitely—a regulatory 
response, a tension arises between the need to quickly capitalize on market 
opportunities and the need to guard against possible liability exposure. 
¶28 Manufacturers may rely on third-party insurance to overcome this 
tension.  Insurance significantly reduces transaction costs by establishing 
beforehand the party responsible for damages if an accident occurs.80  A 
properly functioning insurance market allocates risk and thereby creates 
appropriate incentives for responsible behavior, spreads economic 
consequences of loss, compensates victims, and prevents over-deterrence. 
                                                     
75 Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 310; Krupp & Holliday, supra note 32, 
at B2. 
76 See Press Release, American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), ANSI-
NSP Releases Priority Recommendations Related to Nanotechnology 
Standardization Needs (Nov. 17, 2004), 
http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=8
17; see also Press Release, ANSI, Nanotechnology Survey Launched to Assess 
Industry Needs, Apr. 25, 2006,  
http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=1
202. 
77 See Jonathan Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1513 (Dennis D. 
Paustenbach ed., 2002). 
78 See W. Kip Viscusi, Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and 
Environmental Regulations on Productivity, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 793, 793 
(1983). 
79 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of 
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 944 (1988). 
80 Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 293, 295 (2002). 
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¶29 However, when the insurance market is not functioning properly, 
private insurers behave similarly to risk-averse policyholders and are 
deterred from underwriting risk.81  The world’s largest re-insurance 
company, Swiss Re, notes that the existence of a viable insurance market 
depends on four factors: 
1. Accessibility: Probability and severity of losses must 
be quantifiable to allow pricing. 
2. Randomness: Time of the insured event must be 
unpredictable and occurrence independent of the will 
of the insured. 
3. Mutuality: Exposed persons must join together to build 
a community to share and diversify risk. 
4. Economic feasibility: Insurers must be able to charge a 
premium which is commensurate with the risk, giving 
them a fair chance to write the business profitably in 
the long run.82 
¶30 Subsection A of this section will discuss considerations that 
surround insuring nanotechnology by relying solely on the private insurance 
market.83  Subsection B will argue that, given the unique risks and short 
history of nanotechnology, a private-public insurance program is the 
optimal solution for regulation. 
A. Private Insurance Considerations 
¶31 Insurance policies do not specifically exclude nanotechnology-
related risk.84  As a result, private insurers recently expressed concerns over 
the uncertain risks posed by nanotechnology.85  To exist, insurers must be 
able to diversify their risk portfolio among various policyholders as well as 
                                                     
81 Abraham, supra note 79, at 947. 
82 Swiss Re, Nanotechnology—The Insurers’ Perspective, available at 
http://www.swissre.com (search keywords “nanotechnology insurers’ 
perspective” and select first link) (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) [hereinafter 
Insurers’ Perspective]. 
83 This iBrief does not address risks associated with non-nanotechnology aspects 
of nanomaterial production, for more information see generally Christine 
Robichaud et al., Relative Risk Analysis of Several Manufactured 
Nanomaterials: An Insurance Industry Context, 39 ENV’T SCI. TECH. 8985 (Aug. 
28, 2005), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cgi-
bin/abstract.cgi/esthag/2005/39/i22/abs/es0506509.html. 
84 Walter R. Stahel, The Insurability of Emerging Technologies, in 
NANOTECHNOLOGY: “SMALL SIZE—LARGE IMPACT?” 33 (Annabelle Hett ed., 
2005), available at http://www.swissre.com-nanotechnology_report.pdf. 
85 Wilson, supra note 11, at 706. 
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among various events.  Swiss Re points to three factors making 
diversification impossible for nanotechnology: 
1. Probability and severity of risks are impossible to 
assess. 
2. Many companies, industry sectors and geographical 
regions are affected simultaneously.  
3. Predicting the magnitude of a possible event exceeds 
the capacities of the private insurance industry.86 
¶32 Nanotechnology presents serious concerns across all three of these 
factors.  First, while most previous technological leaps have been in areas 
where a degree of knowledge and experience was available, here sparse 
exposure and toxicology research, a lack of nano-related accident history, 
and the breadth of nanotechnology applications leave insurers without 
reasonable means to classify the risk posed by nanomaterials.87  Second, 
because many countries, industries, government agencies, academic 
institutions, large multi-national corporations and small start-ups currently 
participate in nanomaterial research and development, there is significant 
concern that a nanotechnology-related accident could affect multiple classes 
of policyholders simultaneously.88  Even among individual policyholders, 
nanotechnology risk exists in multiple lines of business and could lead to 
multiple levels of damage—product liability, product recall, workers’ 
compensation claims, director and officer liability, and negative publicity.89  
The number and type of possible claim permutations makes it difficult to 
separate claim processing.  Finally, the extent of potential claims is 
impossible to accurately predict.  Insurers are concerned that “[t]he 
examples of accidents and individual claims frequently mentioned in 
connection with nanotechnology are only the tip of the iceberg.”90  If third-
party liability insurers cannot assess the magnitude of risk, under-coverage 
may financially cripple the policyholder’s business.91  Nanomaterial 
manufacturers also find it difficult to ascertain deductibles, as well as 
determine conditions, exclusions, payout triggers, and indemnity 
limitations.92 
                                                     
86 Insurers’ Perspective, supra note 82. 
87 See HETT, supra note 27, at 40. 
88 Christopher Lauterwasser, Dealing with Risks and Opportunities of New 
Technologies, in NANOTECHNOLOGY: “SMALL SIZE—LARGE IMPACT?, supra 
note 84, at 37. 
89 Id. 
90 HETT, supra note 27, at 39. 
91 See Richardson, supra note 80, at 295. 
92 Id. at 328. 
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¶33 The inability to screen nanotechnology manufacturers through risk 
assessment, to classify nanomaterial risk and to determine which risks are 
excludable from coverage will undoubtedly result in problems with adverse 
selection and moral hazards.93  Specifically, if private insurers are unable to 
appropriately determine deductible and premium levels because they 
possess less information than their policyholders, a disproportionate number 
of high-risk nanotechnology manufacturers will aim to obtain coverage, 
while low-risk manufacturers will elect to remain uninsured.94  Further, 
because the insurer is likely to accurately assess risk only after 
nanotechnology-related accidents occur, the policyholder’s incentive to 
avoid losses is eliminated.95  The problem with inappropriate risk-
mitigating incentives is compounded for judgment-proof enterprises, whose 
insurance coverage and other ability to pay for damages is less than their 
potential nanotechnology-related liabilities.96  Currently, victims of 
nanotechnology-related accidents have no recourse for damages inflicted by 
judgment-proof enterprises. 
B. Private-Public Insurance Proposal 
¶34 A private-public insurance program is a possible solution for 
balancing the nanotechnology enterprises’ dual interests of capitalizing on 
market opportunities and limiting liability exposure with the public policy 
interest of stimulating responsible innovation.  Currently a private-public 
insurance scheme exists to address the low-probability, but high-loss, area 
of nuclear accidents.97  Nuclear accident insurance is covered by the Price-
Anderson Act,98 which provides an excellent template for approaching 
nanotechnology accidents.99 
                                                     
93 See Abraham, supra note 79, at 946-47. 
94 Id. at 946. 
95 Id. 
96 Richardson, supra note 80, at 327. 
97 See Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Ambiguity and Insurance 
Decisions, 75 THE AM. ECON. REV. 386, 389 (1985). 
98 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in 23 U.S.C. §§ 2210, 
2039 (2006)). 
99 Since its enactment, the Price-Anderson Act has been continuously 
challenged.  The Act withstood a constitutional challenge and was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Entl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 
(1978).  Today many organizations including The Cato Institute, Greenpeace, 
Taxpayers for Common Sense and Green Scissors continue to oppose the Price-
Anderson Act.  See Barry P. Brownstein, The Price-Anderson Act: Is It 
Consistent with a Sound Energy Policy?, THE CATO INSTITUTE, Apr. 17, 1984, 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa036.html; Public Citizen, Price-Anderson 
Reauthorization in H.R.6: An Insurance Scam for the Nuclear Industry, 
http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/electricity/energybill/article
 15
2008 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 2 
¶35 The Price-Anderson Act was passed in 1957 and was recently 
extended through 2025 by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.100  The Price-
Anderson Act requires power reactor licensees to obtain the maximum level 
of private sector insurance and, in the event of an accident, contribute 
annually to a secondary insurance fund.101  Currently, all such primary and 
secondary insurance coverage totals over ten billion dollars.102  All losses 
above those covered by the primary and secondary insurance pools are 
handled by the government.103  The Price-Anderson Act indemnifies 
nuclear power reactor licensees from tort liability and precludes victims of 
nuclear accidents from claiming punitive damages.104 
¶36 Inaccurately perceived risks and other externalities cause private 
insurance markets to break down and require government intervention.105  
Private sector insurance providers underwriting nanotechnology initiatives 
confront concerns similar to those faced by private sector nuclear power 
reactor licensees—inability to accurately assess both probability and 
magnitude of loss. 
¶37 A mandatory insurance program, similar to that required by the 
Price-Anderson Act, would significantly reduce adverse selection problems.  
By requiring insurance as a precondition of nanotechnology research and 
development, a diverse pool of risk-seeking policyholders would be created.  
Although the insurers’ inability to set appropriate premium and deductible 
levels would persist, setting fees at a level that precludes the least 
responsible enterprises from coverage would alleviate moral hazard 
problems.  A starting point for determining pricing levels may be based on 
insurers’ experience with the biotechnology or chemical industries.  Further, 
indemnification from tort liability for nanotechnology participants in the 
private-public insurance program would create the necessary incentives for 
high-risk enterprises to adjust their behavior and avoid being uninsurable.  
Mandatory insurance forces manufacturers of nanomaterials to prove that 
their initiatives are safe enough to be insurable. 
                                                                                                                       
s.cfm?ID=10322 (last visited Jan. 21, 2008); Green Scissors, Nuclear Bailout: 
Price-Anderson Act, http://www.greenscissors.org/energy/price-anderson.htm, 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008). 
100 Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 601-610, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
101 AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y, PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: BACKGROUND FOR POSITION 
STATEMENT 54, 1-2, (Nov. 2005), http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf, 
(noting that as of 2005 the maximum level of primary insurance is $300 million, 
and total individual secondary contributions will add up to $95.8 million, capped 
at $15 million per year) [hereinafter PRICE-ANDERSON ACT BACKGROUND]. 
102 Id. 
103 Hogarth & Kunreuther, supra note 97, at 389. 
104 PRICE-ANDERSON ACT BACKGROUND, supra note 101, at 2. 
105 See, e.g., Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, The Risk Management 
Dilemma, 545 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 144, 144 (1996). 
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¶38 The pooling of insurance fees is another important aspect of the 
private-public insurance program.  After accounting for management and 
other expenses, all collected nanotechnology-related insurance premiums 
and deductibles would be pooled across insurers.  A cross-insurer or 
independent enterprise would have management and investment 
responsibility for the pool.  In the event of an accident, claimants would 
receive damages from this pool.  If possible, this pool would be broken 
down into several categories including environmental and employment-
related liability.  Unlike other suggested regulations, the pooling function of 
the mandatory private-public insurance program would eliminate the 
concerns arising from judgment-proof enterprises.  Also, the pool would be 
composed of premiums and deductibles, factors that are directly correlated 
with the level of risk associated with each nanotechnology initiative. 
¶39 If the magnitude of loss from nanotechnology-related accidents 
exceeded an insurance pool’s coverage level, remaining liability would be 
covered by the federal government.  Even though government intervention 
creates an unavoidable moral hazard, the premium and deductible levels 
should be set high enough to prevent the highest risk nanotechnology 
manufacturers from becoming initially insured and therefore from 
operating.  Barring very expensive and persistent nanotechnology accidents, 
the private sector would provide the majority of insurance coverage, freeing 
government nanotechnology expenditures to be applied to research, 
development and risk assessment. 
¶40 A possible criticism of the private-public nanotechnology insurance 
program is that it does not focus on eliminating nanotechnology-related 
accidents, but rather focuses on after-the-fact compensation.  Indeed, the 
private-public insurance program assumes that nanotechnology innovation 
is an essential step in technological evolution and is socially beneficial.  
Therefore, the program’s goal is to prevent the over-deterrence of 
innovation and to take steps to address the nanotechnology-related accidents 
that most commentators perceive to be inevitable.  Although the private-
public insurance program prevents victims from pursuing tort claims, it may 
wind up benefitting victims on balance, as it would replace the risk of the 
tort remedy with the predictability of a no-fault compensation scheme.  
While filing a lawsuit does not ensure the right or ability to collect 
damages,106 a strict liability standard eliminates the need for victims to 
show either causation or fault (tort elements that are difficult to prove given 
                                                     
106 PRICE-ANDERSON ACT BACKGROUND, supra note 101, at 2; see also Richard 
Murray, Liability Regimes in a Changing Risk Landscape, in 
NANOTECHNOLOGY: “SMALL SIZE—LARGE IMPACT?”, supra note 84, at 40. 
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the current sparse research on nanomaterial risk) and allows for predictable 
recovery of damages.107 
¶41 Another criticism of the private-public nanotechnology insurance 
program is that, as with any regulation, it raises the price of market 
participation above what small and start-up businesses can endure.  But 
unlike many previous technological innovations, nanotechnology research 
and development does not occur in entrepreneurs’ garages.  Rather, most 
small and start-up nanotechnology companies are associated with large 
businesses, universities and venture capital funds.  If a small start-up 
business’ nanotechnology innovation is truly promising, that company 
should not have trouble finding appropriate funding for insurance coverage 
from financial sponsors. 
¶42 This insurance scheme also does not address the concern that in a 
global environment the risk of nanoparticle dispersion transcends national 
boundaries.  With nanotechnology production, as with any global economic 
initiative, the threat of developers and manufacturers racing to establish 
laboratories and plants in low regulatory regimes is high.  Although the 
private-public nanotechnology insurance program is United States-focused, 
it provides a starting point for expanding nanotechnology regulation 
internationally. 
¶43 Lastly, the private-public insurance program does not eliminate 
difficulties with classifying nanotechnology research and risk.  It creates a 
derivative question of who is a nanomaterial manufacturer for regulation 
purposes.  However, mandating private-public insurance creates appropriate 
incentives for manufacturers, insurers and the federal government to 
collaborate on establishing appropriate research, development and risk 
standards. 
CONCLUSION 
¶44 The same novel nanomaterial properties that are predicted to create 
a one trillion dollar market by 2015 are also likely to create significant 
health and environmental risks.  The benefits and dangers associated with 
nanomaterials stimulated fierce debates over appropriate nanotechnology 
regulation.  Commentators and interest groups have proposed a wide range 
of possible regulatory solutions.  This iBrief argues that a viable regulatory 
solution exists in the insurance market.  A hybrid private-public insurance 
program resolves the current difficulties insurers face with accurately 
assessing the probability and magnitude of nanotechnology-related loss.  
Further, the private-public insurance program allows for collaboration 
                                                     
107 Richardson, supra note 80, at 301. 
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among manufacturers, insurers and the federal government in establishing 
standards. 
¶45 To create appropriate incentives, the private-public nanotechnology 
insurance program requires: (1) mandatory participation as a precondition to 
research and development, (2) creation of a cross-insurer pool of premiums 
and deductibles to use for claimant payouts, (3) federal government 
coverage of losses exceeding coverage provided by a cross-insurer pool, 
and (4) indemnification from tort liability of program participants.  
Although the private-public insurance program does not resolve many 
existing nanotechnology obstacles, it is a way to balance commercialization 
and risk concerns. 
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